2: Milosz S-5 (no date)1953 El Europe El

is needed if Christianity is to be reborn. The religious fervor of the Christians in the people's democracies would seem to indicate as much. One merely wonders if theirs isn't the piety of a mouse caught in a trap, and if it hasn't come just a bit too late.

The official order is to evince the greatest horror of the West. Everything is evil there: trains are late, stores are empty, no one has money, people are poorly dressed, the highly praised technology is worthless. If you hear the name of a Western writer, painter, or composer, you must scoff sarcastically, for to fight against "cosmopolitanism" is one of the basic duties of a citizen. Cosmopolitanism is defined as admiration for the (bourgeois) culture of the West. The term was invented in Moscow, and is not new in the history of Russia. Over a hundred years ago, Tsarist historians spoke with aversion of the "decadent West." It was in the decadent West of that time that Marx and Engels were writing, and it is from that West that it later proved necessary to import not only their work, but many other discoveries as well. In practice the fight against cosmopolitanism in the people's democracies takes the form of elaborate prescriptions indicating which Western writers of the past (those "progressive for their day") can be translated, what Western painting and music (usually created before 1870) is "healthy," etc.

No mattter how much trouble these detailed orders create for editors, publishers, and music directors, the "fight against cosmopolitanism" is not entirely without rational justification. Its motive in the Center is clear: too broad a scale of comparison is incompatible with the moral health of the citizens. In the people's democracies, which have been subjected to Western influence for centuries, it is a question of liquidating bad habits. You break a smoker of his habit by taking away his cigarettes.

7:Gluckstein S-4 (no date)1952 El Europe El

parties and organisations to concentrate all forces for the mobilisation of the masses. The Party appeals to the Social Democratic Party, the trade unions and all other working-class organisations to bring about immediately unity of action and trade union unity. The Party appeals to all democratic forces of Rumania to act in concert for the immediate mobilisation of the workers, peasants and all other sections of the labouring masses of the Rumanian people and of all other nations living in Rumania in order to prevent the interference of Nazi Germany in the internal affairs of Rumania, in order to achieve the dissolution of all Nazi agencies in Rumania (the fascist and Trotskyist parties and organisations), the prohibition of their propaganda and the arrest of their leaders, and in order to set up in place of the pro-fascist Tătărescu Government a government which would adopt the slogan "for peace, liberty, bread and land" and would unite all democratic parties and organisations with the national Zaranist Party (Maniu's Party—Y.G.) in the lead.' (*International Press Correspondence*, 27th November, 1937).

In defending himself against the Communist Party's attack, Maniu tried to quote such statements as this, but of course the Communist-controlled censorship and police were on the alert. On January, 1946, the censor of the Russian Occupation Authorities struck out an item in the Opposition paper *Ardealul* which gave a verbatim quotation from the 1938 edition of the *Small Soviet Encyclopaedia* in which Maniu's party was described as anti-Fascist, democratic and pro-Soviet. (*Manchester Guardian*, 14th January, 1946). The Communists obviously could not allow Maniu to quote what they had repeatedly said about him in the years 1936-39. Now the slogan of their alliance with Tătărescu in the General Elections of 1946 (which allotted 75 seats in the new Parliament to Tătărescu's party as against 68 to the Communists) was: 'Do not vote for Maniu, who shot the workers in 1933.'

When the Russian Army entered Poland, a group headed by Andrzej Witos, Wladyslaw Kowalski, Wincenty Baranowski, Antoni Korzycki, Jozef Putek, Bronislaw Drzewiecki and Stanislaw Banczyk proclaimed themselves the leaders of Stronnictwo Ludowe, (S.L.), the Peasant Party. Some of them, like Kowalski, Korzycki, or Baranowski were simply Communists in

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was the extreme nationalism that characterized many political and military leaders. In this region, diversion of state expenditures from armaments to social welfare and gestures of friendship to neighboring countries were regarded by many as a form of treason. The schools and the press preached incessantly that the vindication of a nation's territorial aspirations was a value of the highest order, and authoritarian leaders, acting in the name of such doctrines, generally met with little resistance. It was frequently only a small group of liberal-minded professional men, and in some cases the peasant parties, that placed a high value on social and economic improvement and resisted the authoritarian trend. Thus nationalism, which a century earlier had formed the vanguard of liberalism, now became its most treacherous enemy.

Any account of the vulnerability of free institutions must also comment on the peculiar and often fatal tolerance which democratic governments have exhibited during the past two or three decades towards those who have overtly threatened its existence. Those who governed free states hesitated to deny traditional rights to Communists, fascists, and others even though these groups clearly intended to use such rights to facilitate their own seizure of power. Many pages of recent history have chronicled this dismal story, especially those which tell of the success of German and Italian fascism and of Lenin's bid for power in Russia. Not until 1930 did the political leadership of the Weimar Republic muster the courage to ban street demonstrations, uniforms, vigilantism, and other abuses of the traditional rights of association and expression. By that time, however, Hitler had already sealed the fate of the Republic. He triumphed, even as Mussolini and Lenin had done before him, because the legal regime failed to deny him the opportunity of perverting the privileges of a free state. Among the narrower and more tangible causes of the great reaction, the paralysis

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sented by the Communists as the liberation of the Ukrainian, Byelorussian, and Lithuanian peoples from the yoke of the Polish landlords; Hitler's war against France and England were presented as a battle against Anglo-Saxon imperialism. After the fall of France the Polish Communists, together with those sent from France, assumed a neutral attitude toward the Nazi occupation and terror in Poland. They did not take part in the underground struggle of the Polish nation. They were tolerated by the Gestapo and moved about freely. Only after Hitler's attack on Russia in 1941 did they regain the "spirit of patriotism" and join the Polish underground struggle against Hitler.

Various events greatly discredited the reputation of the Polish Workers' Party (one of the guises under which the Polish Communists masqueraded during the war years). Such events were the massacre of the Polish war prisoners at Katyn, the death of hundreds of thousands of people deported to Soviet forced labor camps in the years 1939-1941, the deportation in 1944 of over 40,000 members of the underground Home Army who had been fighting against the Germans and aiding the entering Red Army, and the return to Poland of a number of Poles who had experienced the Soviet reality. Further discredit was brought to the Polish Workers' Party by the presence of the Communist Lublin Committee. The Committee seized power in Poland with the aid of the Soviet army and the NKVD and nominated as ministers of the government persons who had been in the German concentration camps and had served the Gestapo faithfully.

According to its reports in 1937, the Communist Party of Poland had 6,000 regular members and 12,000 members in the Communist Association of Polish Youth. Experts are of the opinion, however, that these figures were exaggerated by the leadership of the party which was afraid of presenting to Moscow a true report of the extent of its influence. *New*

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642 177 Stalin-Tito relations her communist system was much further advanced than that of any other Iron Curtain country, and since the break with Stalin only insignificant changes have been made in the structure of the highest organs of government. Tito still declares clearly and without any reservation that he intends to maintain the communist system in that country at any price.

IV

●208 661 When communist propaganda speaks of the liberation of the oppressed masses from the slavery of the privileged and the rich, it stresses the term, People's Democracy. But does this term really signify freedom? Does it respect human dignity? Does it recognize equality among the people? Does it abolish undue privileges and the exploitation of the working people? It does not. In practice, it does not even provide personal freedom or personal security.

697 661 The overcrowded prisons and the many thousands of people in the forced labor camps bear witness to this. The Soviet Union and all the countries occupied by it are a large prison from which the majority of the people would escape if they only could. They would flee from the "Communist paradise" partly because of the difficult economic conditions, but mostly because of the unbearable atmosphere created by the insecurity and complete lack of freedom which are part of this system.

The majority of the people escaping today are average people—workers, peasants, craftsmen, small merchants, and others who have never belonged to any privileged or exploiting class. I have read a number of books on the living conditions in the Soviet forced labor camps; I have studied thousands of reports of Poles who have passed through Soviet camps and prisons; I have had hundreds of talks with the victims of the Soviet regime. And I have come

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241 The peasants do not like regimentation and therefore the
185 Communist economic plans have not brought about any increase in agricultural production.

208 The collectivization policy has further aggravated the situation. The peasants hate even the word "collective." They go about their work with indifference or with fear and hatred. Their aversion to coercion, dictatorship, and controls, their attachment to their land, and their pride in independence, have neutralized all the advantages of large-scale production with its mechanization and its use of modern agricultural methods. The Communist belief that large-scale operation would bring about efficient agricultural production has not materialized.

262 Agricultural production is decreasing. Eastern Europe
433 used to be a very large exporter of all agricultural products,
241 but it is suffering from shortages today. Food is scarce in these agricultural countries. Before the Second World War, nine out of ten residents of Czechoslovakia were nourished by the produce of Czechoslovakian agriculture. There were no rations. Everybody could buy what he wanted, and the standard of living in Czechoslovakia was the highest in Eastern Europe. Today, according to official Communist pronouncements, every second man in Czechoslovakia, despite strict rationing, has to be supplied from abroad. Milk, butter, and eggs are not distributed to adults at all, and even sugar is in short supply. Czechoslovakia, once the largest exporter of beet sugar in Europe, today cannot provide its diminished population with sugar although it has nearly 15 per cent fewer inhabitants than before 1938 due to the expulsion of the Germans. Bulgaria and Hungary, which had great surpluses of all agricultural products before the last war, must now import foodstuffs for their starving populations. Agricultural production in Eastern Europe has not yet attained the prewar level, although the free farms of Western Europe have surpassed it considerably.

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people accept them as their due and can no longer visualize life without them. A large and, according to official claims, growing part of national income is being spent on social insurance, public health, family allowances, maternity and children care, workers' vacations, so-called physical culture, and the like. There is no comparison between the philosophy of the welfare state in Britain and that of Communism in Eastern Europe, but there are some similar functions in both systems. For much the same reasons that the Conservative government in London could never think of taking back the social reforms of the Labor government, no post-Communist government in Eastern Europe will be able to consider curtailing the privileges accorded to the working class by the present regimes.

V

The most important and politically the most decisive of the privileges granted by the State is education, understood always strictly in the Communist sense of the term. The Communist regimes are aware that they cannot seriously expect to win the minds of the majority of the adult population. Anyone who was twenty years old in 1938 in Bohemia or Moravia, in 1939 in Poland, in 1941 in Serbia, and as late as 1944 in Hungary or Rumania, can contrast his present situation as an individual and as a part of his nation to his situation under a non-Communist government, however imperfect the latter may have been. There is no way of knowing how many of these men and women regret the past and hate the present, but they undoubtedly constitute a large majority of the adult population of the area. From the Communist point of view, these men and women are incurable. The future of the Red regimes depends on the youngsters who know nothing about the past, are isolated from the freedoms of the West, and are daily taught that Russia is their shim-

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ing example. The regime knows that it cannot assure a decent standard of living to the adult population and probably realizes that the coming generation will not live much better. However, it hopes that the young ones will be more pliable. Since they will not know that life can be better, they will not grumble. In the political and moral field, the desire to capture the minds of the youth is what industrialization is in the economic domain—the primary goal to which all others must be subordinated. From another angle, education, especially technical education, is the necessary counterpart and precondition of the fully industrialized, urbanized, and mechanized socialist society.

The first point of the Communist program for the young generation is to insure its numerical strength. Before the last war, the populations of Poland, Rumania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and Slovakia were increasing with great though gradually diminishing rapidity. In the Czech lands proper and in Hungary, the natural increase was low with a trend towards demographic standstill. Some economists believed that the key problem of Eastern Europe, that of rural poverty due to overpopulation, could not be solved unless the population ceased to multiply so rapidly. From the strictly economic point of view, there was much truth in that assertion. The Communist regimes, including that of Yugoslavia, have taken the opposite stand. Their publications wage a war against the prewar theory which they say is born of despondency characteristic of capitalism. Communism, they claim, will solve all problems. But to prosper, People's Democracies need many children. Whether because of these social policies or because of other reasons, the prewar trend toward low natality has been reversed in most countries of the area. No demographic data on Rumania have been published for some years, which may mean that the policy of high natality has not been successful there. Elsewhere, data show that many more children are being born now than before the war and

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decided difference in emphasis. It is significant that in August 1941, shortly after the Nazi invasion of Russia, the Soviet government summoned an All-Slav Congress to Moscow. The emphasis of this meeting was on industrialization, cultural autonomy, and respect for the national culture and language of each Slav people. The message sent by the Congress to the Slav peoples was typical of its sentiments:

> Oppressed brother Slavs! A grave danger threatens us. The hour has struck for the entire Slavic world to unite and destroy fascism utterly and without loss of time.
>
> We have come together as equals among equals. Our one, burning desire is that the Slavic nations, together with all other nations, should live their lives freely and in peace within the boundaries of their countries.

In a speech later that year, on November 6, Generalissimo Stalin amplified these sentiments by declaring:

> Our aim is to aid the peoples in their liberation struggle against the Hitler tyranny and then to provide them with the opportunity freely to build their life in accordance with their desire. There must be no interference with the domestic affairs of other nations.

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To this Slavic appeal was added an admiration for the Soviet war effort. Many Slavs saw the Russian sufferings as mirroring their own on a gigantic scale, so that the ordinary peasant, to whom a military account of a Red Army victory would mean nothing, carried in his mind a vivid image of the scorched earth, the devastation which Russia suffered, and the hardships and ferocity of his Slav brother's struggle. With the memory of their own unaided fight deeply rooted in their minds, the Slavs watched Russia bearing the brunt of the land war in a way they could understand because the conditions were familiar to them. In Yugoslavia, for example, the Communist Party's growing prestige as the war progressed provided the Soviet Union with a great measure of reflected glory as a communist state. Many Yugoslavs transferred their admiration for the Communist Party's role in their own

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186 liberation struggle to admiration for communism itself, and
● 208 so to the Soviet Union.

Thus the Soviet myth—the supposed victories of the ideals of social reform of the Bolshevik revolution over police and bureaucratic persecutions of the Tsars—went hand in hand with the ties of race of the old Slav mystique. But by 1946, the emphasis of Pan-Slavism shifted to a position reminiscent of the "Slavophile" doctrines of the nineteenth century. Danilevski's prophecies in his *Russia and Europe* (1869) were in the process of realization. Using the language of peace and love, which seemed to him two typical Slav qualities, he had predicted a federation under Russian leadership, as the outcome of a war between Russia and Europe. The federation would consist of Russia (including Galicia, northern Bukovina and Carpatho-Ukraine), the territory of the South Slavs with Istria and Trieste, Rumania, the Czech and Slovak territories, Hungary, Bulgaria, Greece, and Constantinople, as well as sections of Turkey. Many of his prophecies, which at the time undoubtedly seemed fantastic, have come true in the last five years.

648 The triumph of Russia over Eastern Europe set the tone
186 for the great Slav Congress which was held in Belgrade on December 8, 1946. That the permanent headquarters of the Pan-Slav movement was to be located in this city, as was the headquarters of the Cominform newspaper—*For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*—is hardly surprising. The speeches and the program of the Congress proclaimed that the Slav peoples lead the world both in the struggle against war, for peace and democracy, and in cultural achievements. Finally, the Congress created the usual organizational methods to further Slavic cultural cooperation. A serious blow was dealt by Tito's defection from the orbit to this attempt at empire building through the Pan-Slav idea, but nevertheless the flow of propaganda continued.

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nist Party in Yugoslavia seized power, at the end of the war, 648
the thin veneer of friendship for the West disappeared. In unison with its neighbors, Yugoslavia directed its controlled press and radio to speak in diatribes and strictures against the "capitalistic and warmongering Western democracies," and, at the same time, to speak in glowing terms of their brother Slavs and comrades-in-arms, the people of the Soviet Union.

The rupture between Belgrade and Moscow has not [208]
changed this picture in its essentials. Soviet pressure on Tito has not caused him to alter the existing one-party political or economic structure of his country. Just as Tito has demanded that the socialist countries base their relationships on the principle of equality because he is aware of the Soviet Union's aims in Europe, so too he will resist Western demands for the modification of his policies in return for economic and military support.

The Soviet Union erred in trying arbitrarily to mold the Balkan area to the Kremlin pattern. It failed, in the manner of dictatorships, to take into account the long South Slav tradition of opposition to tyranny and conquest. Unfortunately for the Soviet Union's expansionist plans, the pattern did not allow for the forces of human nature, of which there seem to be more in the Balkans than elsewhere in the world. Only if one recognizes that this is a problem in power relations rather than an ideological dispute, can one grasp the full implications of this dispute.

The shift of Yugoslavia at this juncture is best described 648
by what has been termed "integral nationalism," which ex- 186
presses itself in totalitarian terms. Integral nationalism is totalitarian not only in domestic affairs, but in foreign affairs as well. The nation attempts to make itself feared or "respected" by pursuing firm and bold policies. The nature of Tito's rise to power, the geographical characteristics of Yugoslavia, and Tito's power position relative to the Balkan states

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tantly or not at all. Unemployment became worse than it had ever been.

Thus social tensions persisted or grew worse. Sometimes they appeared as growing tensions between left and right, with the political middle-of-the-road parties increasingly threatened by fascists or by communists. Sometimes they appeared as tensions between different nationality groups, such as between Serbians and Croatians or between Czechs and Germans. Often the same angry and frustrated individuals could be found backing communism in one year, extreme nationalism in another, and some more or less supranational fascism in a third. Whole districts voted for right-wing radical candidates in one election and for left-wing radicals in another. Nationalism in Eastern Europe was thus the symptom of a more fundamental maladjustment, even though nationalistic policies, once adopted, often served to make this maladjustment worse. Nationalistic governments, as well as most other governments in this region, were becoming increasingly unpopular and during the 1930's showed increasing reluctance to face their own voters. By 1939, before the first German or Russian soldier stepped on their soil, every country of Eastern Europe, with the exceptions of Finland and Czechoslovakia, had succumbed to some form of dictatorship. Nationalism had thus failed to cure the fundamental maladjustments of Eastern European political and economic life. From some points of view its failure was hardly less shattering than the failure of the supranational empires that had preceded it.

It was nationalism which first undermined and in part destroyed the traditions of property and the respect for property in Eastern Europe. This attack against property began as early as the era of Prince Bismarck in Germany. The so-called Polish legislation sponsored by the German government and by the German nationalists during and after the Bismarck era showed scant respect for the property